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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
W I L L I A M J . COLMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

I
1

vs.

I

A. J . B U T K O V I C H and G E N E V A
A. B U T K O V I C H , Husband and wife;
G. W . A N D E R S O N , and J E A N N E
D. BANKS, and all unknown persons
who claim any interest in the subject
matter of this action,
Defendants-Appellants

f
\
!
a
1
j
J

Case

No

-

13868

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
Plaintiff sued to quiet title to a parcel of property
located in Park City, Utah, claiming ownership and
that the tax title of Defendants was a nullity. The defendants Butkovich answered claiming title superior to
plaintiff's to all but a small part of the property claimed
by plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
After trial, the lower court entered a decree quieting title to the property in plaintiff based on findings
I
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that plaintiff had color of title and that the tax deeds
from Summit County were void because the descriptions of the land were fatally defective. The lower court
denied a motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law and to alter the judgment filed by defendants.
...I".:,
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the decree
quieting title in him sustained by this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants Butkovich obtained their title to
the property by two quit-claim deeds from Summit
County on July 9, 1964, and April 15, 1965. Summit
County had previously, in 1915 and 1940, obtained title
by Auditor's Tax Deeds resulting from tax sales in
1910 and 1935. The deeds from the County were in
customary form,, except that the legal descriptions were
void for uncertainty.
The description in the first Summit County Deed
to the Butkovichs. dated July 6, 1974, read,
"All unplatted land in Block 29, and also land
West of Block 29 and lots 1 and A. P C 364".
Thereafter correctory deed was given by Summit
County to the Butkovichs, dated April 15, 1965 which
read,
"All unplatted land in this Block (29 PC)
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and all land West of this Blk. and Pt. lot 1: Pt.
.lot A . " ;
These are the sole conveyances out of Summit
County upon which the Butkovich tax title is predicated.
On February 15, 1966, Mr. and Mrs. Butkovich
executed and delivered to Security Title Company a
Warranty Deed for lands in Block 29, Park City Survey
somewhat similar to the description in the April, 1965
correctory deed and followed it by a metes and bounds
description supplied by Mr. Butkovich. The same day,
Security Title Company executed and delivered back
to Mr. and Mrs. Butkovich "as joint tenants", the
identical property. The metes and bounds description
is that shown on page 7 of appellants' brief. That brief
erroneously implies that such is a part of the correction
deed from Summit County (Entry 58 of abstract, Exh.
11 A ) . That description did not appear until Mr. Butkovich delivered it in 1966 to Security Title Company
for preparation of the two deeds. H e said that such
(Exh. 5) was prepared by Mr. Raymond L. Griffith,
(Tr. 68) a surveyor for Mountain Fuel Supply Company. However, Mr. Griffith denied that he had prepared it or given it to Mr. Butkovich. (Tr. 109)
Both Plaintiff and the Defendants Butkovich had
paid taxes on the property. On the issue of possession,
neither had fenced, cultivated or occupied the land (a
hillside in the Park City area) and the trial Judge
found, No. 4 (R. 155) that 'There is no evidence that
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either of the parties has had exclusive possession of the
property or has actively occupied, cultivated, fenced
or otherwise used the property, except in a very casual
manner."
Plaintiff's title to the involved land came by a
Warranty Deed dated November 12, 1968 from Robert
T. Banks, as Trustee and individually, describing:
"All that part of the N W 1/4 of the SE 1/4
of Section 16, Twp 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, that lies Westerly of
Norfolk Avenue/ 1
As reflected by the abstract of title, Exh. 11 A,
that property had been vested in 1916 in The Assets
Corporation and in Park City Townsite. Neither had
conveyed out after that date and no other title claimant
appears of record from 1916 until the 1968 Warranty
Deed to Plaintiff. Along with that deed was recorded
the Affidavit of Robert T. Banks explaining the expiration of the two title holding corporations and his
authorization to sell. H e conveyed as Trustee and individually.
Mr. Robert B. Jones, is a Utah licensed land surveyor employed by Bush and Gudgell (Tr. 16). H e
has made 400 to 500 surveys in the Park City area and
did one on this property (Exh. 8). H e was later asked
about the posibility of platting, locating or surveying
the descriptions contained in the two deeds from Summit
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County to the Butkovichs, which read, 1964, "All unplatted land in Block 29 and also land west of Block
29:" and in 1965, "also land west of Block 29". To both
of these enquiries he answered in the negative (Tr. 28).
However, as to the Plaintiff's description, such was
locatable as it is encompassed within the legal quarter
section description. Defendants presented no evidence to
disprove such testimony.
Judge Sorensen, after hearing the evidence, seeing
the demeanor of the witnesses and considering the memoranda submitted by the parties, issued his Memorandum
Decision (R. 152) as follows:
"The court concludes that, as between the
parties, plaintiff holds color of title. The court
further concludes that the tax title held by defendants is void from its inception. See Edwards
v. City of Santa Paula, 292 P.2d 31, Meyereort
v. Warrington, 19 So.2d 433, and Burton v.
Hoover, 93 Utah 498.
The statute of limitations is therefore not applicable, and title is ordered quieted in plaintiff. '
ARGUMENT
;

I.

T H E 1964 A N D 1965 D E E D S F R O M SUMM I T C O U N T Y W E R E A N U L L I T Y A S TO
T H I S P R O P E R T Y — V O I D B E C A U S E O F TOT A L L Y D E F E C T I V E D E S C R I P T I O N AND
5
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P L A I N T I F F IS NOT B A R R E D BY STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.
The law in Utah and generally is that a legal description must be adequate to identify the property if a
conveyance is to be effective. This applies to tax deeds
as well as to ordinary conveyances. Let us cite the three
cases identified in Judge Sorensen\s Memorandum Decision. The critical issue is the sufficiency of the portions of the two tax deeds from Summit County:
1964 . . . . "also land West of Block 29".
1965 . . . . "all land West of this Block." (29PC)
In Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, Calif. 1956, 292
P.2d 31, the issues in the quiet title suit revolved around
a tax sale and deed referring to certain lots in "Block
68 Subdivision". There was no Block 68 Subdivision of
record in the Recorder's Office. In the decision holding
that the fee title owner would have been barred by the
statute of limitations, except for the fact tha the description in the deed was fatally defective, the Court
said in part:
"To be sufficient the description must be such
that the land can be identified or located on the
ground by use of the same. Best. v. Wohlford,
144 Cal. 733, 736, 78 P. 293. Parol evidence is
always admissible in aid of application of the
description to its subject matter, but not for the
purpose of completing a description which is
inherently not susceptible of application to the
ground."
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"There are no presumptions or intendments
in favor of the description of a tax deed. Sinai v.
Mul, 80 Cal. App.2d 277, 280, 181 P.2d; Harvey
y. Meyer, 117 Cal. 60, 64, 48, P . 1014. The intention of the assessor or grantor (state) is not
a proper subject of inquiry for the proceeding is
in invitum, the property owner has no intention
which enters into the deed, he may stand upon its
insufficiency, and the taxing agency or the state
must adhere to settled basic rules in describing
the property or the deed will be void.''
Meyerkort v. Warrington (Mississippi), 1944, 19
So. 2d. 433. A tax sale was conducted in which the lands
were described as part of certain sections:
"This alleged tax sale, as well as the assessments upon which it was based, was utterly void
for want of description. The pretended descriptions were as follows:
T t . Sec. 28 Tp. 12 R. 3 E, 5 acres,' and T t .
Sec. 29 Tp. 12 R 12 E , 100 acres/ and T t . Sec.
30 Tp. 12 R 12 E, 29 acres,' and the other four
descriptions were in like terms. That such an attempted description is no description whatever
and that a tax deed containing the nullity is no
deed at all has been settled in several of our
cases, among which are Cogburn v. Hunt, 54
Miss. 676, and Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563,
5 So. 104, 7 Am. St. Rep. 679."
"Appellees' third contention is that appellants,
the Meyerkorts, are barred by Chapter 196, Laws
1934, Sec. 717, Code 1942, because suit was not
brought within two years after April 4, 1934, the
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: -;-.elective date of that Act. The sale to the State
being utterly void for want of description, there
was no tax deed to the land here in question,
wherefore the cited statute does not apply, nor
does any other such statute, save the ten-year
statute of adverse possession, and this only to the
lands actually occupied, and not to the calls of
the deed; for in a tax paper such as in this case
there are no calls. W e pursue this issue no further
than to cite Pearee v. Perkins, 70 Miss. 276, 12
So. 205, and Patterson v. Morgan, 161 Miss. 807,
138 So. 362—statutes of limitation do not run in
favor of the holder of a tax deed void on its face.
61 C.J. p. 1427."
Thus, in this case, it was held that the descriptions
in the tax deed were void, hence the statute of limitations would not be initiated nor run against the owner.
The Utah case cited is Burton v. Hoover, 1937, 93
Utah 498, 74 Pac. 2d 652. This involved a quiet title
procedure on lands in Wasatch County. The tax title
was based upon a purported description of lands, "Sec.
7-5-4" and 'See. 18-5-4". The Court held that notwithstanding the legislative authorization for abbreviations
(Sect. 80-1-6 U.S. Utah 1933, now Sec. 59-1-6 U.C.A.
1953) the tax deed was void as no realty was described
as the township and range were not indicated. Citations
were given of like matters and that such are "confusing
in the extreme, and intolerable when employed as a
means by which to divest title to real estate without the
consent of the owner".
"And the omission to designate whether the
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range is east or west, and the township north or
south, is likewise held fatal. Wilson v. Jarron, 23
Idaho 563, 131 P.12; Sears v. Murdock, 59 Or.
211, 117 P. 305; Noble v. Watrous, supra. The
first requisite in a description of real property
is a definite basic starting point, which is entirely
lacking when, as here, the description fails to
indicate any township or range, or, if that were
indicated, whether north or south, or east or west,
or even from which of two meridians the land is
to be located."
I n Utah we have another decision that touches upon
this issue, namely Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 442, 85
P.2d 827. There the court construed the validity of a
tax deed identifying Lot 15 of Highland Park "Subdivision", and held that the use of the word "addition"
in place of "subdivision" was not a fatal defect. A general statement of the law in Utah is found at page 828 as
follows:
"Was then the description of the property in
the tax sale proceedings so indefinite or erroneous as to invalidate such proceedings? The Courts
have consistently held that if a description in tax
proceedings is too vague, too indefinite, to notify
the owned that it is his property that is being
tawed, and insufficient to inform prospective
purchasers a to what property is to be sold, the
resulting taw title after sale is void3' (underling
ours)
Olsen v. Bagley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P . 739;
Tintic Undine Mining Company v. Ercanbrack,
et al., 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184."
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;
A very extensive annotation of the law relating to
ambiguities in descriptions of lands in deeds and whether
parol evidence may be submitted to explain such ambiguities, is found in 68 A.L.R. 4-105. At page 65 is a
discussion of ambiguous descriptions in deeds executed
at judicial sales. It is stated there that the courts have
usually applied a stricter rule of construction in case of a
deed executed at a judicial sale, such as tax deeds, than
in the case of a deed between individuals.
Ail extensive annotation is in 133 A.L.R. 570 which
deals with the applicability of specific statutes of limitations relating to tax titles. The summary of the holdings as made by the editor of the annotation is as follows:
:•>'•••••• "Where the description in a tax assessment or
tax deed does not describe the property purported to have been sold for taxes, or the description thereof is so vague, uncertain or erroneous
that the property in question cannot be identified,
it has been held or stated that limitation periods
provided for the purpose of barring attacks on
tax sales are not applicable to protect tax titles
based thereon."
A reading of the cases cited in the annotation reveals that descriptions far more comprehensive than the
one involved here have been held to be patently insufficient, and as a result the tax deed void and the statute
of limitations inapplicable.
The fatal defect in the two deeds from Summit
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County to the Butkovich is that the conflict with Plaintiff's property would be based upon, if at all, the descriptions, "also land West of Block", No perimeter of
the parcel is given. Does it run westerly to the Pacific
Ocean, to the West line of Utah, Summit County or to
the summit of the next mountain? The fatal uncertainty
of this was testified to by the licensed surveyor, Mr.
Jones (supra) when he said that he could not survey or
locate such a tract.
In consequence, the Butkovichs acquired no right,
title or interest in property adverse to Plaintiff. There
is no basis for attempting by speculation to clarify this
void description by use of parol evidence. In any event,
no official of Summit County was called to explain that
verbiage. In Davidson v. Bobbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517
P.2d 1026, your Court held that parol evidence is admisible to apply, but not to supply, a description of lands
in a contract. That decision can give no comfort to appellants in this case.
W e are not unmindful that the Utah Legislature
strove mightily to cloak tax titles with a mantle of
strength. The enactment of the sections relating to the
statutes of limitations were for that very purpose. Appellants point to Section 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2,
U.C.A, 1953, as amended, to claim that Plaintiff's cause
of action is barred. They say that more than four years
had pased from the date of the first tax deed on July 6,
1964, until filing of this action on June 24, 1971. Sec-
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tion 78-12-5.1 is the seven year statute and 78-12-5.2 is
the four year statute. The thrust of the Appellant's
position is that Plaintiff was not in possession as required by said two sections.
Had the Butkovichs acquired prin^a facie valid title
to the involved property by the deeds from Summit
County, some merit would be conceded for the assertion
of that position. However, where the tax title as to these
lands is fatally defective because the same does not describe the realty, then the tax title statute of limitations
cannot be asserted.
II.
DEFENDANTS, BUTKOVICH, CREATED
N O T H I N G B Y T H E 1966 D E E D E X C H A N G E
W I T H M E T E S A N D BOUNDS D E S C R I P TIONS.
The complete inadequacy of the Butkovichs' tax
deed must have been realized by him shortly after the
1964 deed as he applied to Summit County for a correctory deed in 1965. This was basically a change of the
word "also'' to "all" and in no way placed any dimensions or perimeter to the land "west of said Block". Mr.
Butkovich testified that later he went to Security Title
Company and was told he must get a "proper description
on it" and could not even then insure it until five years
had passed. (Tr. 68). Then he brought to Security Title
Compay a legal description from, which was prepared a
12
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Warranty Deed from the Butkovichs to Security Title
and a Quit-Claim Deed to the Butkovichs as joint tenants from Security Title (Exhs. P-3 and P-4 respectively) both dated February 15, 1966. These were recorded February 23, 1966.
No one has advised the Court of the origin of the
metes and bounds description supplied by Mr. Butkovich
for the deeds. The surveyor denied creating such. H e
had good reason for doing so, as it not only encompasses
land owned by Mr. Colman (plaintiff herein) but several residences which are not owned or claimed by any of
the parties hereto. It appears to be an irresponsible and
reckless attempt by a wild description to initiate a title
where none previously existed.
This is the first time that the Butkovichs appear of
record to have any asserted interest in the involved
lands. However, this was sort of a "bootstrap operation"
whereby the Butkovichs tried to assert an interest by
creating it through their own deed to Security Title.
Prior to that time, they had no interest as the two Summi County deeds did not have a valid legal description
which could be platted, surveyed or possessed. This fact
was known to the Butkovichs as evidenced by the refusal
of Security Title to insure and requiring that Mi\ Butkovich get a legal description, exchange deeds and then
wait for five years.
W e observe that the Appellants cite the case of
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Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814. Here
a tax title was being litigated and the four year statute
(Sect. 78-12-5.1, U.C.A. 1953) was asserted. The
Court's decision affirmed the purpose of that statute as
one of repose "after another has received a tax title
valid omits face", (emphasis ours). That is the problem
which Mr. Butkovich was trying to overcome. His tax
deed was not valid on on its face. H e recognized it.
Security Title recognized it. In an apparent effort to
be helpful, he was told to bring in a valid legal description, exchange deeds, record them and then wait for five
years. No greater confirmation of the invalidity of the
two deeds from Summit County could be asked.
III.
P L A I N T I F F H A S COLOR O F T I T L E TO
THE PROPERTY
IV.
D E C R E E Q U I E T I N G T I T L E IN P L A I N T I F F IS P R O P E R AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The evidence of Plaintiff's title is direct and is
shown by Exh. 1-A which reflects that title was in Park
City Townsite (a corporation) by a Sheriff's deed
November 21, 1916, and in The Asets Corporation by a
deed from Michigan Trust Company dated December
14
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28, 1916. No recorded conveyances appear from either
corporation since 1916. In 1968 we find the recorded
Affidavit of Robert T. Banks which fully explains how
he became the Trustee and owner of such assets in these
two inactive corporations. The final step is the November 12, 1968, warranty deed from Robert T. Banks "as
Trustee and individually" to William J . Colman, Plaintiff and Respondent herein.
This established in the record of this case prima
facie evidence of title in plaintiff, William J. Colman.
Judge Sorensen enquired as to the "quality of title"
essential to enable judgment to be rendered in favor of
the plaintiff in this proceeding. With over 52 years of
continuous uninterrupted title in the corporations, 1916
to 1968, a clear "root of title" was proven within the
intent and purpose of Chapter 9, Title 57, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, relating to Marketable Record Title.
That is the "unbroken chain of title of record to any
interest in land for forty years", as defined by Section
57-9-1.
The adoption of this Chapter by the Legislature of
Utah was an effort to wipe out old concepts of absolute
marketability and to relate the issue to a more recent
period of time (40 years). This pattern has now been
adopted by many states as a necessity, as chains of title
grow longer and longer (this one started in 1877 by
U.S. Patent), In recognition of the newness of the
approach, our Legislature gave a guide to the Courts

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of Utah for interpretation. Section 57-9-9, U.C.A. 1953,
as amended, reads,
"This act shall be liberally construed to effect
the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions. . /"'
The Utah State Bar Association likewise took steps
in aid of such interpretation and the fundamental purpose of placing at rest old land title defects and facilitating current land transactions. Having in mind the 52
years, 1916 to 1968, let us consider the impact and guidance in the Title Standards of the Utah State Bar.
Standards 46 through 56 deal with various phrases of
the Marketable Title Act. Standard 47 refers to "a connected series of conveyances or other title transactions of
public record in which the root of title has been a matter
of public record for at least forty years." (underlining
is ours).
Mr. Colman's title has such a root, going back to
1916. It seems significant that the Standard uses the
phrase "or other title transactions" (taken from Section
57-9-1 of the statute) in addition to the reference to
"conveyance". This is a clear recognition that the curative purposes of this wise legislative step might involve
the application of liberal interpretation to other documents. The combination of the Affidavit and the Warranty Deed in 1968 by Robert T. Banks is such "other
title transaction" of significant import to transfer title
to M r volman. We note that he warranty deed to Mr.
16
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Cohman is by Mr. Banks "as Trustee" as well as in an
individual capacity. The concurrent Affidavit, read
along with the warranty deed, show that he was endeavoring to pass the complete title of The Assets Corporation and Park City Townsite Company to Mr. Colman.
Had we the task of drafting the deeds now, perhaps
more exact words of art might have been employed. Mr.
Banks is deceased now, so we cannot go back to a correctory deed.
Title Standard 48 refers to the language of "purporting to divest", as found in Section 57-9-1(2) of the
statute. The two deeds in 1916, one from the Sheriff to
Park City Townsite Company and one from The Michigan Trust Company to The Assets Corporation, certainly purported to divest title. The Sheriff's Deed
described the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Meridian, which is the property at issue. The
other deed was more general. Now the next conveyance
in 1968 to Mr. Colman is a Warranty Deed by Mr.
Banks "as Trustee and individually", and such certainly
divests all title which grantor had, both as Trustee for
the record title owners and individually. Section 57-1-12
relating to Warranty Deeds says:
"Such deed when executed as required by law
shall have the effect of a conveyance in f e simple
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto be-
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longing, with covenants from the grantor, his
heirs and personal representatives, that he is lawfully seized of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from
all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs
and personal representatives will forever warrant
arid defend the title thereof in the grantee, his
heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever."
In Title Standard No. 48 we find the following
language: "A recorded instrument may also purport to
divest even though there is not a complete chain or
record title connecting the grantee in the divesting instrument with the forty year chain." At the trial some
reference was tossed out that the Banks to Colman was a
"wild deed". Such is not a fact, as Mr. Banks warranted
the property as "Trustee" as well as individually. This
makes the conveyance a valid and enforceable transfer
and not merely an act of a interloper in the title. The
Affidavit under oath is a recorded document under the
Marketable Title Act and must be considered, particularly as the concurrent act of the grantor in making the
Warranty Deed as Trustee. Such is an explanation of
the status of the title. With two inactive corporations the
difficulties were obvious and this does constitute evidence of "other title transactions" as contemplated by
the Statute and by the Standards.
Appellants contend that the plaintiff must rely on
18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the strength of his own title and not the weakess of the
tax title of the defendants. The decision of Olsen v. Park
Daughters is cited to fortify this legal proposition, 29
Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d, 145. This legalism was stated in
that case but was merely as an aside, as the case was
decided on the issue of Marketable Record Title Act vs.
boundary by acquiesence. Mr. Olsen had an unbroken
chain of title running back to a root of title more than 40
years old (1886). However, the channel of the Provo
River and a fence along the west bank had apparently
been the boundary line acquiesced in for over 50 years.
The boundary by acquiescence theory won.
This Olsen v. Park case stands for the legal principle that the Marketable Record Title Act did not apply
"to defeat the more fundamental boundary by acquiescence as established in defendants." If we consider the
"quality of title'' required to prevail in a case, we should
remember that in boundary by acquiescence cases such
as Olsen and others, the prevailing party has no fee title
and no root or chain of title. Thus, in order for your
Court to find the issues in favor of Mr. Colman in the
present case as against the defendants, no actual established chain of title is required.
Has Utah always required a plaintiff to have a
marketable title to be a successful plaintiff ? The answer
must be in the negative. Boundaries by acquiescence are
one example. In an Occupying Claimant proceeding,
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one merely needs "color of title" (see Section 57-6-4
U.C.A. 1953). •;..•'.:..,
:•,,-:-.
,,
The Olsen case cited (supra) is the most recent
Utah decision known to us on the Marketable Record
Title Act. Part of the decision reads:
"The Marketable Record Title Act has for its
purpose encouraging repose and discouraging a
controversy by providing for elimination of ancient defects in title."
This is consistent with plaintiff's purpose in this
proceeding. The fee title is in plaintiff and such can be
adjudicated by this Court. The transition from the companies who took title in 1916 to Mr. Colman, through
Mr. Banks, Trustee, may not be in ideal documentation,
but as against the defendant and the world, none can
assert a better, prior or superior title. Appellants are
critical of Mr. Banks and challenge his position as a
Trustee. This is immaterial to them. They are not stockholders in either corporation and have absolutely no
privity with them or Mr. Banks. Prima facie evidence
of title has been adduced before the court sufficient to
sustain the affirmative Decree quieting title in plaintiff.
In turn, we challenge the position of Appellants in
attempting to attack plaintiff's title in this proceeding.
W e have discussed above in detail the void nature of the
defendants' tax deed from Summit County because of
the fatal inadequacy of the description. A recent word
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from, your Court on tax titles, Huntington City v.'C.
W. Peterson, 30 Utah 2d. 407, 518 P.2d 1246 said in
part:
"Before the holder of a tax deed can deprive
the record owner of land, the burden is upon him
to establish his title by showing that the tax and
all proceedings in connection therewith were
strictly according to the statute." (p. 1249)
Thus, we reaffirm that the burden is on Butkovich in
this case. The title to this property came out of the
United States by patent during the 19th Century and is
now vested in someone. We believe it is in the plaintiff obviously, not in the defendants. Sections 78-12-1 and
78-12-7.1 U . C A . as amended, say that in a quiet title
proceeding, "the person establishing legal title to such
property shall be presumed to have been possessed
thereof within the time required by law; . . . "
CONCLUSION
The stability of titles to real property is a desirable
end to be achieved. It is abundantly clear that the appellants cannot sustain and have not proven any title to
the realty here involved. The purported tax deeds from
Summit Couty were fatally defective as to this property.
No portion of this property was conveyed thereby to
the Butkovichs.
The trial Court has found that Plaintiff had "color
of title" within the requirements of the law. Both the
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Marketable Record Act and the Utah Bar Title Standards sustain such a finding and the Decree quieting title
in the Plaintiff. We respectfully urge that this decision
be affirmed by your Court. The great care exercised by
the trial court is deserving of affirmation and application
of the presumptions of propriety customarily followed
by your Court.
Respectfully submitted,
H A R R Y D. P U G S L E Y
N E D WARNOCK
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